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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Personal Income

Tax-CAPITAL GAINS ON SALES TO CONTROLLED

CORPORATIONS-SECTION

1239

NOT APPLICABLE TO TRANSFERS OF

PATENT APPLICATIONS

Lan Jen Chu v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1973)

1
CAPITAL GAINS AND DEPRECIATION-DOUBLE

TAX BENEFIT

By transferring a capital asset to a corporation which he
controls, the transferor may reap substantial federal income tax
benefits if the transferred property is depreciable in the hands of
the corporation. These benefits result from two factors: the favorable tax rates applied to gains on sales and exchanges of capital
assets,' and depreciation deductions which the corporation can
2
take against the stepped-up basis of the transferred property.
Assume, for example, that an individual who pays federal
income tax at the rate of fifty percent holds a patent which qualifies
as a capital asset 3 pursuant to section 1221 of the Internal Revenue
I

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201, 1202, 1221, 1222.

In the case of an individual, long-term capital gain (see note 6 infra) is taxed according to
one of two statutory provisions. Under § 1202 of the Code, 50% of the excess of net
long-term capital gain over net short-term capital loss is deducted from gross income,
leaving only the remaining 50% to be taxed at ordinary rates.
Where it produces a lesser tax, the "alternative" method outlined in § 1201 is used.
Section 1201(b) imposes a 25% tax on the excess of net long-term capital gain over net
short-term capital loss ("net § 1201 gain"), but, except for the transitional provisions
contained in §§ 1201(d)(1) & (2), this 25% rate applies only to that part of such gain not
exceeding $50,000 (or $25,000 in case of a married individual filing a separate return).
Effectively, the tax on "net § 1201 gain" in excess of $50,000 is computed under § 1201(c) as
if the basic (§ 1202) method applied. Thus, an effective rate as high as 35% (including the
minimum tax for tax preferences, §§ 56-58, the rate may actually be as high as 40%) may
apply to such excess (i.e., applying the maximum rate on individuals of 70%, § 1(c), to 50%
of the excess gain).
Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167 (providing deduction from gross income for depredation of property used in trade or business or held for production of income).
3 Interestingly, other products of the mind, such as copyrights, literary, musical and
artistic works, letters or memoranda, "or similar property" in the hands of the creator, are
specifically excluded from the definition of "capital asset." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1221(3)(A). The House version of this subsection's predecessor in the 1939 Code would
have excluded patents held by inventors from this definition. See note 79 infra.
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Code of 1954. Rather than market the invention himself and pay a
fifty percent federal income tax on the proceeds, 4 the patent
holder sells the patent to his wholly owned corporation. 5 In return
the corporation agrees to pay the transferor/shareholder fifteen
percent of the gross price of each unit sold. If the transferor has
held the patent longer than six months, 6 his royalty-like receipts
from the corporation will be treated as long-term capital gain and
will be taxed at an effective rate of twenty-five percent.7 Although
the corporation will not enjoy the benefits of the fifteen percent it
must pay to its shareholder, it will not pay tax 8 on this portion of
income from sales of the invention because during the seventeen
year life of the patent the corporation may deduct as depreciation
the amount paid for the patent.9 Thus, the patent holder retains
effective control over the marketing of the invention while avoiding a considerable portion of the tax burden which would accompany such marketing if he were to undertake it personally.
In order to restrict this practice and halt the abuse inherent in
transactions among separate entities which nevertheless comprise a
single economic unit,10 Congress enacted section 117(o) of the
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1, 61(a)(2).

5 The example refers to the transferor's wholly owned corporation for simplicity. While
it is true that at one time an individual could claim a capital gain on sales of depreciable
property to a wholly owned corporation, the transferor's or transferee's interest in the
transferee or transferor corporation was limited to 80% in 1951 by the passage of
§ 117(o) of the 1939 Code. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L No. 183, ch. 521, § 328(a), 65 Stat.
504. Section 1239(a)(2) of the 1954 Code continues this limitation. See note 11 and
accompanying text infra.
6 "The term 'long-term capital gain' means gain from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset held for more than 6 months .... " INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1222(3). Gain from the
sale of capital assets held for less than 6 months--short-term capital gain-is taxed at
ordinary rates. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1201, 1202.
7 This rate assumes a 50% tax rate on ordinary income and no offsetting capital losses.
Since § 1202 provides a deduction from gross income of 50% of the excess of net long-term
capital gain over net short-term capital loss, the taxpayer will pay a tax at his ordinary rate of
50% on only one-half of his net capital gain, i.e., an effective rate of 25% on his total net
capital gain.
8 Sections 11(b)(2) and (c)(3) of the Code provide respectively for a corporate income
tax on taxable income of 22% plus a surtax of 26% on taxable income exceeding the amount
of the "surtax exemption," for an effective tax rate of 48% on all taxable income above the
amount of the surtax exemption. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ I 1(b)(2), (c)(3). At present the
surtax exemption is $25,000. Id. § 11(d).
9 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-3, (a)-6. When a patent expires
it has no value, and therefore no salvage value, so that depreciation can be taken in an
amount equal to the entire purchase price.
10 As one court pointed out,
[by] 1949 the corporate rates of tax, under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as
amended, had been raised substantially in excess of capital gains rates. Any small
group of persons organizing a corporation could obtain a stepped-up basis on
property sold to the corporation for the purpose of depredation against a 52% tax
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Internal Revenue Code of 1939, now section 1239 of the 1954
Code.1 1 This section provides that in the case of a sale or exchange
of depreciable property between a husband and wife, or between
an individual and a corporation where the individual directly or
indirectly holds more than eighty percent of the stock, any resulting gain shall be treated as ordinary income.
II
Lan Jen Chu v. Commissioner
In Lan Jen Chu v. Commissioner,1 2 however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit exposed a significant inadequacy in section 1239 of the Code. Lan Jen Chu, a professor at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and "an eminent authority
on electromagnetic theory and antenna systems,"1 3 during the
summer of 1956 had filed with the United States Patent Office an
rate or even a 90% excess profits tax rate at a cost to the stockholder sellers of only
the 25% capital gains tax rate on the gain on the sale of the property to a
corporation. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue requested remedial legislation
of the United States Congress ....
Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 253, 256 (S.D. Ind. 1958).
11 § 1239. Gain from sale of certain property between spouses or %between
an individual and a controlled corporation
(a) Treatment of gain as ordinary income.
In the case of a sale or exchange, directly or indirectly, of property described in subsection (b)(1) between a husband and wife; or
(2) between an individual and a corporation more than 80 percent in
value of the outstanding stock of which is owned by such individual, his spouse,
and his minor children and minor grandchildren;
any gain recognized to the transferor from the sale or exchange of such property
shall be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of property which is neither a
capital asset nor property described in section 1231.
(b) Section applicable only to sales or exchanges of depreciable property.
This section shall apply only in the case of a sale or exchange by a transferor of
property which in the hands of the transferee is property of a character which is
subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167.
(c) Section not applicable with respect to sales or exchanges made on or before May
3, 1951.
This section shall apply only in the case of a sale or exchange made after May
3, 1951.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1239. Section 1239 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is
substantially identical to § 117(o) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. See S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 444 (1954); H.R. REI. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A286 (1954).
The Technical Amendments Act of 1958, § 56, 72 Stat. 1645, amended 26 U.S.C.
§ 1239 by adding subsection (c) to indicate that § 1239 applied "only in the case of a sale
or exchange made after May 3, 1951," to coincide with the date when the earlier provision,
§ 117(o) of the 1939 Code, came into effect.
12 486 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1973), aff'g 58 T.C. 598 (1972).
13 Id. at 697.
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application for a patent 14 on a completely enclosed antenna system.
The application consisted of eighteen different daims.' 5 Claims
1-13 represented the heart of the invention while claims 14-18
pertained to an alternative design of lesser potential marketability.
In 1957 the Patent Office replied that claims 14-18 appeared to be
allowable,' 6 but that claims 1-13 were disallowed. Two amendments to the original application were subsequently filed, but the
only change reflected in Patent Office replies was that along with
claims 14-18, claim 12 similarly appeared to be allowable. Meanwhile in August 1959, Chu Associates, Inc. was formed for the
purpose of manufacturing antennas. At the time of incorporation,
Chu held eighty-nine percent of the issued shares.
In December 1959 Chu assigued his entire interest' 7 in the
patent application' 8 to the corporation in exchange for $2,000
14 A patent is statutorily defined as "a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the
term of seventeen years... of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
invention throughout the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
A patent application is "a petition to the Commissioner of Patents to grant letters patent
to the inventor on the basis of the facts disclosed in the application, especially in that section
of it known as the Specifications." M. DOCK & W. SANDERSON, A FORTUNE IN YOUR HEAD 16
(1963). It is among "the most difficult legal instruments to draw with accuracy." Sperry v.
Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963), quoting Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892).
Included in the patent application must be "a drawing (except in chemical cases); a detailed
description and specification... and one or more claims which legally define and limit the
precise scope of the invention." R. BucKLs, IDEAS, INVENTIONS AND PATENTS 82 (1957). The
specification and oath or declaration must be in English. 37 C.F.R. § 1.52 (1973). Ink, paper,
margins, and page numbering are specified by regnlation and all interlineations and other
alterations must be verified. Id.
Is The claims are of prime importance in a patent application:
[The] definitions of the invention, which the solicitor prepares, become the claims
of the patent application. The claims, when allowed by the Patent Office, are the
very heart of the issued patent. The patent claims define the area of activity from
which the patent owner may exclude everyone else, so they are the feature of the
patent which gives it value to the owner.
R. BucKL~s, supra note 14, at 80.
The drafter's art is to disclose as little as possible in the claims while drawing the
broadest claims possible. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
1
The Patent Office informs the applicant formally of allowahiity in a notice of
allowance. 37 C.F.R. § 1.311 (1973). After the notice of allowance has been sent the
application will not be "withdrawn from issue" except for mistake of the Patent Office, fraud
or other illegality in the application, or for "interference." 37 C.F.R. § 1.313(b) (1973). When
the applicant pays the issue fee the patent will issue "in regular course." 37 C.F.R. § 1.314
(1973).
17 Rights to the patent were jointly held by Chu and his colleague, Ivan Faigen, in
interests of 11/12 and 1/12 respectively. Prior to the assignment to Chu Associates, Inc.,
Faigen assigned his 1/12 interest to one Rines. The payments received from the transferee
corporation, therefore, were to be divided between Rines and Chu in proportion to their
respective interests.
18 The assiguability of patent applications is recognized in 37.C.F.R. § 1.331 (1973).
The assignee of record is entitled to conduct the prosecution of the application to the
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payable immediately, $60,000 to be paid in 1960, and fifteen
percent of the gross selling price of every antenna system manufactured and sold by the corporation in each year thereafter, subject
to a minimum $15,000 annual payment. Subsequent to the assignment, a third amendment to the patent application was filed, 1 9 this
time with success. The Patent Office allowed all claims and on May
30, 1961, a patent was issued to the assignee corporation. In his
income tax returns for the years 1962 through 1965 Chu reported
as long-term capital gain $250,000 which he had received in annual
payments for the assignment of the patent application to Chu
Associates, Inc. The Internal Revenue Service asserted a
deficiency, claiming that since Chu owned more than eighty percent of the assignee corporation's stock, any gain arising from the
patent assignment had to be treated as ordinary income pursuant
20
to section 1239 of the Code.
exdusion of ihe inventor, 37 C.F.R. § 1.32 (1973), and the patent will normally issue to the
assignee. 37 C.F.R. § 1.334 (1973). But, with certain exceptions, such as refusal, the inventor
himself must execute the application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1970); 37 C.F.R. § 1.46 (1973).
When the situation fits within one of these exceptions to the general rule, an assignee may
make the application for patent. 35 U.S.C. § 118 (1970). If the invention appears to be
patentable and commercially exploitable, sound reasons point to beginning commercial
exploitation prior to patent issuance:
If the firm marks the products "Pat. Pending," or "Patent Applied For,"
competitors may be discouraged from copying the invention, so that in practical
effect the period of the patent term may be extended during the time that the
application is pending.... [S]uch patent marking does not constitute a legal bar...
[but] in most cases competitors will not wish to risk a substantial investment...
knowing that their program may be legally interrupted as soon as the patent issues.
R. BUCKLES, supra note 14, at 98.
19 It appears that the extended period between initial application and award of patent
experienced here is the rule. "The average patent application remains pending in the Patent
Office for three or four years before the patent issues .... R. BUCKLES, supra note 14, at 98.
Aside from the obvious magnitude of the Patent Office's task in searching the alreadyknown state of the art to determine whether the daimed invention is really something novel,
another cause of delay is the extensive interchange between the Patent Office and the
applicant. The applicant (or more likely the applicant's patent attorney) makes claims as
broad as possible. See note 15 supra. The Patent Office examiner, on the other hand,
requires that daims be narrowly stated. The daims which are novel and patentable or which
are anticipated by the prior art and finally rejected are in effect distilled out by a process of
amendment by the applicant and rejection by the examiner. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653, 658 (1969).
20 In this case the patent application was transferred five months after formation of the
corporation. In a proper case-i.e., where formation of the corporation and transfer of
property take place almost simultaneously--the IRS could make an argument based upon
§ 351 of the Code for disallowing capital gains treatment. That section operates to defeat
capital gains treatment on the transfer of property to a corporation where after the transfer
the transferor has control of the corporation. Section 35 1(a) provides that "[n]o gain or loss
shall be recognized if property is transferred to a corporation . . . solely in exchange for
stock or securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange [the transferor is]
.. in control . .. of the corporation." The corporation takes the transferor's basis in the
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Both the Tax Court2 1 and the First Circuit2 2 rejected the
Commissioner's deficiency claim, but in neither court did the
decision turn on the IRS contention that Chu was foreclosed by
section 1239(a)(2) from claiming a long-term capital gain because
he owned "more than 80% in value of the outstanding stock" of the
assignee.23 Instead, the decision turned on section 1239(b), which
requires that the transferred property be "of a character which is
subject to the allowance for depreciation" in the hands of the
transferee. The court of appeals said that "[t]here can be no
doubt that, in general, patent applications are not depreciable
property. '24 The government argued that since the statute applied
to "property of a character subject to depreciation" the statute
should be construed so as to apply not only to depreciable property
"but also to the transfer of property of the type which might
ultimately become depreciable." 25 The court of appeals rejected
this liberal interpretation of the statute, finding that such a conproperty exchanged, which in the case of a patent may be zero, so that the overall effect
would be to negate completely the desired tax advantage. The transferor would get no
capital gains advantage and the corporation would have no stepped-up basis in the property
for depredation purposes.
According to one observer,
[if] the requirements of section 351 are otherwise met, and the "seller" seeks to
avoid that section simply by forming the corporation in a section 351 transfer and
shortly thereafter "selling" the property to the newly-formed corporation, the
Commissioner should have little difficulty in showing that the later sale was an
integral part of the corporation's formation, so that the two steps (organization and
sale) were effectively a single section 351 transfer.
Ellis, Tax Problems in Sales to Controlled Corporations, 21 VAND. L. REv. 196, 206-07 (1968)
(citing Labrot v. Burnet, 57 F.2d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1932)). But see Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. United
States, 159 F. Supp. 253, 257 (S.D. Ind. 1958) (describing unsuccessful attempt to apply
forerunner of § 351, § 112(b)(5) of 1939 Code, in situation where patent applications were
transferred to wholly owned corporation).
21 58 T.C. 598 (1972).

22 486 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1973).
23 If Chu had held precisely 80% of the corporation's stock it is open to question
whether he would have avoided the reach of § 1239(a)(2). While that section literally applies
only where an individual owns "more than 80% in value" of the transferee's or transferor's
capital stock, the language has been liberally interpreted in at least one case. The transferor
held precisely 80% of the corporate transferee's stock in United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d
402 (5th Cir. 1967), but the court nevertheless applied § 1239. Although the taxpayer owned
only 80% in number of shares, the court held that because of restrictions on the remaining
shares this stock represented more than an 80% interest in value. See Ellis, supra note 20, at
201.
24 486 F.2d at 702 (citing United States Mineral Products Co., 52 T.C. 177 (1969);
Hershey Mfg. Co., 14 B.T.A. 867, affd, 43 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1930)).
25 486 F.2d at 700.
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struction was supported neither by the statutory language 26 nor by
27
the legislative history.
The IRS made the alternative argument that Chu's patent
applications were sufficiently "matured" to be treated as issued
patents for purposes of section 1239 according to the standards
enunciated in a Seventh Circuit decision, Estate of Stahl v.
Commissioner,28 and that, therefore, capital gain was improperly
claimed. Although declining to endorse the Stahl "maturity" distinction, both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit nevertheless found it inapplicable on the facts since "[niot
only had no Notice of Allowance been granted on his application at
the time of transfer, but the primary claims of that application had
been thrice rejected. '29 Therefore, the patent applications were not
"matured" as were their counterparts in Stahl.
26

Id The court noted that the section's caption, "Section applicable only to sales or

exchanges of depreciable property," evidenced the congressional scheme.
27

Id

28

442 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'g in part 52 T.C. 591 (1969). In Stahl the taxpayer

had sold to his wholly-owned corporation all his interest in eight patents and five patent
applications in return for 15 notes in the principal amount of $300,000, one note to mature
each year over a 15 year period. Stahl reported his income from the sale as long-term capital
gain. The IRS asserted a deficiency based on § 1239 of the Code, claiming the gain was
ordinary income. The Tax Court agreed with the IRS that income from that part of the sale
attributable to patents was indeed ordinary income under § 1239. As to income derived
from sale .of the patent applications, however, the Tax Court held that, unlike patents,
patent applications are not "property 'of a character' which is subject to the allowance for
depreciation within the purview of section 1239(b)." 52 T.C. at 600.
On appeal the Seventh Circuit partly reversed the Tax Court and broadened the
coverage of § 1239 by distinguishing patent applications which had been the subject of a
notification of allowability from the Patent Office from applications which had been initially
rejected or on which the Patent Office had given no indication of intended disposition. The
patent applications in the former category, the court said, "were sufficiently matured... as
to require that they be treated as patents for purposes of section 1239." 442 F.2d at 328.
Although in Stahl the Seventh Circuit had applied § 1239 to gain realized on the
transfer of a patent application about which the Patent Office had merely noted that some
claims "appear[ed] allowable," (442 F.2d at 328), the First Circuit, deciding this same
question with regard to claims 12 and 14-18 in Chu (see notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text
supra) held § 1239 inapplicable. The court said that "in the instant case claims 1-13 were the
'heart' of the patent, and until they had been declared 'allowable,' the application as a whole
must in substance be regarded as having been rejected." 486 F.2d at 703.
29 486 F.2d at 703.
Lan Jen Chu has been followed in a similar case by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. In Davis v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), a notice of
allowance was sent ten months after the taxpayer had sold all his rights in an invention to his
controlled corporation. A patent was issued shortly thereafter. The IRS unsuccessfully
argued that the patent application was sufficiently matured at the time of sale to be treated
as depreciable property for purposes of § 1239, citing Estate of Stahl v. Commissioner, 442
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Given a transfer of patent fights between a corporation and an
individual when the more-than-80%-interest provision of section
1239(a)(2) is met, Lanjen Chu shows that the tax consequences will
vary depending on the occurrence of an event which is largely
inconsequential in its tax implications: the granting of a patent. If
the rights are embodied in a patent, the transferor will realize
ordinary income. If the rights are not yet embodied in a patent (or
if the patent application is not sufficiently "matured" according to
Stahl) the transferor will realize capital gain. The court of appeals
recognized the implications" of their holding:
Unless § 1239 is interpreted as the government suggests, a
significant loophole could be created in the application of that
section. It would be a simple matter for a tax conscious inventor
to sell his pending application to a controlled corporation, pay
capital gains on the excess of the purchase price over his basis,
and then, once the application has been approved, allow the
depreciation
corporation to write-off against ordinary income,
30
on the now stepped-up basis of the patent.
III
CLOSING THE BREACH-SECTION

1239

A. Applicability of the DepreciationAllowance to Patent Applications
Section 117(o) of the 1939 Code (now section 1239 of the 1954
Code 3 1) was enacted by Congress in 1951 in order to restrict the
double tax benefits that resulted from a transfer of depreciable
property within a single economic unit. 32 Patent transfers were
F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971). In affirming the Tax Court, the court of appeals cited Stahl for the
proposition that a patent application subject to a notice of allowance is within § 1239, and
Lan Jen Chu for the proposition that this patent application was not depreciable and
therefore not subject to § 1239. The court recognized that the purpose underlying § 1239 is
defeated in this kind of situation:
It is asserted that the legislative intent behind § 1239 was to prevent situations in
which a taxpayer sells appreciated property at current market prices to his controlled corporation and thus, while keeping control over the property, reaps the
benefits of both capital gains treatment for himself and depreciation deductions
against ordinary income in his controlled corporation. Unquestionably this was
done in the present case. This points up another tax loophole in the Internal
Revenue Code. It is our view that only Congress can plug that loophole.
491 F:2d at 710.
30 486 F.2d at 700.
31 See note 11 supra.
32 See H. R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. RE. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1951). Section 1239 of the 1954 Code is virtually identical to its predecessor, § 117(o)
of the 1939 Code. See note 11 supra.
The statute has been criticized for its omission of non-depreciable property. The sale to
a controlled corporation of a non-depreciable asset with a stepped-up basis offers the
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intended to come within the statute's scope.3 3 This section will
explore the applicability of depreciation to patents and patent
applications in examining the premise in Lan Jen Chu that patent
applications are not depreciable. Solutions for closing the section
1239 gap will be suggested.
It is a general rule that no allowance for depreciation will be
permitted unless the property has a "limited and determinable
existence. '3 4 Because the life of an intangible asset can rarely be
determined with any certainty, it is more difficult to depredate
than a tangible asset. 35 Thus, such intangibles as "goodwill, trade
names, trade brands, newspaper subscription lists, formulae, and
rights to receive royalties on copyrighted books are not ordinarily
subject to depredation ....-36 A patent, although an intangible,
does have an ascertainable life of seventeen years, and it is due to
37
this certainty that patents qualify for the depreciation allowance.
A patent application on the other hand has no definite life, since it
may remain an application indefinitely until a patent is issued or
finally rejected, or the applicant abandons his attempt to obtain a
patent. 38 Treasury Regulation section 1.167(a)-3, although not
specifically mentioning patent applications, suggests that a patent
application does not qualify for depreciation since it appears to fall
within the category of "[a]n intangible asset, the useful life of which
is not limited .... 39a
On the other hand, Revenue Ruling 67-136
transferor the same tax benefit as the sale of an asset on which the corporation can take
deductions for depreciation:
The purpose of enacting section 1239 was to prevent the corporation from
obtaining a stepped-up basis against which future depredation deductions could be
taken, while the seller paid only a capital gains tax on the sale. Since land is not
depreciable. ... the statute was made inapplicable to land. This is somewhat
surprising since essentially the same tax advantages which section 1239 seeks to
deny can be obtained if land suitable for development is sold to a controlled
corporaOon. The corporation can develop and sell the land, using the stepped-up
basis to offset ordinary income received on the sales.
Ellis, supra note 20, at 200.
" See, e.g., S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 69 (1951), (patent transfer illustrates
section's effect).
"' See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956); 4 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 23.12, at 70 (1973 ed.).
35 4 J. MERTENS, supra note 34, § 23.10, at 49.
36Id. at 53.
31 See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-6(a) (1956) (cost or other basis of patent depreciable over
remaining useful life).
38 See note 46 infra.
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3, T.D. 6452, 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 123.
The Internal Revenue Service has argued both sides of the question at various times.
Compare Best Lock Corp., 31 T.C. 1217 (1959) (IRS claims patent rights nondepreciable
prior to patent issuance), and Century Tank Mfg. Co., 18 T.C.M. 430 (1959) (IRS claims
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states that "patent applications relating to inventions on which a
'40
patent will be issued in the normal course are depreciable.
Unfortunately, the Revenue Ruling does not elaborate on the
phrase, "issued in the normal course." It seems likely, however,
that this phrase refers to patent applications which are the subject
of a notice of allowance. After a notice of allowance has been
communicated to the applicant by the Patent Office and the issue
fee paid, a patent will issue "in regular course" unless one of a
41
group of specified issues develops.
It is consistent with the majority of Tax Court decisions 42 and
the position of the IRS in general that the IRS did not argue in Lan
Jen Chu simply that patent applications are depreciable. Rather, it
argued that since section 1239 applies to "property of a character
which is subject to the allowance for depreciation," therefore "the
limitations on capital gain treatment imposed by that section apply
not only to the sale or exchange of depreciable property, but also
to the transfer of property of the type which might ultimately
become depreciable. ' 4 3 By refraining from arguing that patent
applications are per se depreciable, the IRS apparently wanted to
occupy a middle position, avoiding a direct challenge to the traditional notion that patent applications are nondepreciable, while at
the same time maintaining that, under certain circumstances, patent applications are so similar to depreciable property that the
restraints of section 1239 should apply.
In general, patent applications fail to meet the requirements
for depreciability because of their unpredictable duration. Nevertheless, for some patent applications the deduction for depreciapatent applications not subject to depredation), with Lan Jen Chu, 58 T.C. 598 (1972), aff'd,
486 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1973) (IRS daims patent application "property of the nature
contemplated by section 1239"), Estate of William F. Stahl, 52 T.C. 591 (1969), ffd in part,
442 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971) (IRS claims § 1239 should apply to proceeds from sale of
patent applications), and Benjamin 1. Davis, 31 T.C.M. 1155 (1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 709 (6th
Cir. 1973) (IRS claims § 1239 applicable to patent application transfers).
Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 58.
41 See note 16 supra.

42 The Tax Court has not maintained a consistent position on the depreciability of
patent applications. Thus, in Julian A. McDermott, 41 T.C. 50 (1968), Best Lock Corp., 31
T.C. 1217 (1959), and John A. Nelson Co., 28 B.T.A. 529 (1933), aff'd, 75 F.2d 696 (7th Cir.
1935), rev'd on other grounds, 296 U.S. 374 (1935), the Tax Court either held or stated as
dictum that patent applications are depredable. The majority of Tax Court decisions,
however, have held patent applications non-depredable. See, e.g., United States Mineral
Prods. Co., 52 T.C. 177 (1969); International Cigar Machinery Co., 36 B.T.A. 124 (1937);
Hershey Mfg. Co., 14 B.T.A. 867 (1928), aff'd, 43 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1930); Individual
Towel & Cabinet Service Co., 5 B.T.A. 158 (1926).
"' 486 F.2d at 700 (emphasis in original).
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tion seems appropriate. The IRS apparently accepts this view when
the issuance of a patent is certain enough that the life of the patent
application can be estimated with reasonable accuracy. 44 In his
concurring opinion in Lanjen Chu, Judge Campbell was impressed
by the fact that "[platent applications represent the same underlying res-the invention-as do patents . both waste; both are, in
theory if not in fact, depreciable. ' 45 Like patents, patent applications fit the broad guidelines of section 167(a) allowing a deprecia46
tion deduction. They are subject to "exhaustion, wear and tear"
and are used "in the trade or business" or "for the production of
income. ' 47 Even without reference to An ascertained useful life, the
annual depreciation deduction could be determined by reference
to the annual royalties paid on the purchase price where this
manner of payment is used. 48 Specific regulations for determining
4 See Rev. Rul. 67-126, 1967-1 CuM. BULL. 58; note 40 and accompanying text supra.
4 486 F.2d at 705 (concurring opinion).

40 Patent applications are exhaustible in at least three ways. First, as representative of
the underlying invention, the application has value only so long as the invention has value.
The march of technology today may overtake and render obsolete yesterday's innovation.
Second, the application itself may "wear out." After a process of rejection by the Patent
Office and amendment by the applicant, the patent examiner may conclude that none of the
claims are patentable and issue a final rejection. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 658
(1969); 37 C.F.R. § 1.1 I3(1973). The applicant must either cancel each finally rejected claim
or appeal from the rejection of each. 37 C.F.R. § 1.113 (1973). Third, an application may
simply be abandoned. The applicant mst respond within six months after an official notice
from the Patent Office, or within a shorter period if so fixed by the Commissioner of
Patents. 37 C.F.R. § 1.135(a) (1973). If he fails to respond within the designated time, the
application is considered abandoned. Id.
"' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a).
48 In Associated Patentees, Inc., 4 T.C. 979 (1945), three inventors and an investor
pooled their various patent rights on an equal share basis and formed a corporation to which
the four shareholders assigned their patent rights. The corporation licensed a third party to
use some of these patents in return for which the corporation was to receive a royalty equal
to 5% of the gross sales price of products manufactured under the license. In turn, each of
the four shareholders was to receive a royalty from their licensor corporation of 20% of all
royalties it received. The licensor corporation tried to deduct its own royalty payments to its
four shareholders as a normal business expense, but the Commissioner asserted a deficiency
which was upheld by the Tax Court on the grounds that the royalty payments did not
represent expenses but rather the cost of acquiring capital assets.
On rehearing to determine the amount of depreciation allowable to this Corporation,
the Tax Court held that the total cost of the patents over their lives was depreciable. The
Tax Court recognized that due to the method of payment, a determination as to the final
cost of the patent to the licensor corporation was impossible at that time and therefore, the
ordinary method of computing depreciation by proration of the total cost over the expected
life of the asset was impossible.
Pointing out that § 23(I) of the 1939 Code (now § 167(a) of the 1954 Code) provided
for a "reasonable allowance," and required no specific method for computing depreciation,
the Tax Court held that the method used by the petitioner corporation, whereby it deducted
its annual royalty payment to its assignors as depreciation, was reasonable. 4 T.C. at 986.
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depreciation in such cases might be promulgated, thereby bringing
this inchoate property squarely within section 1239 of the Code. 49
Considering the magnitude of such a change, potentially affecting
any patent application, relative to probably fewer instances where
section 1239 will be avoided in the Lan Jen Chu fashion, such a
remedy perhaps appears less desirable to the IRS than retaining an
imperfect status quo. But this drastic shift is not required, for more
practicable reform measures exist.
B. Judicial Solution
One approach to reform was demonstrated by the Seventh
Circuit in the Stahl decision, 50 which extended the reach of section
1239 by *treating "mature" patent applications as patents. 51 The
Stahl extension of section 1239 is supported by the statutory
language "of a character . . . subject to the allowance for depreciation, ' 52 which invites a liberal construction. And perhaps
most importantly, Stahl's limited extension of section 1239 to patent
applications seems to carry out this section's underlying legislative
purpose to restrict tax benefits resulting from sales of capital assets
among related parties. 53
As a permanent device to plug the section 1239 loophole,
however, the significance of Stahl is limited by easy avoidance. In
(Section 167(b) of the 1954 Code, a section enacted since the date of the cited case, does
provide for the "use of certain methods and rates" but these methods are not exclusive.) The
IRS has approved the method of calculating depreciation used in Associated Patentees. See
Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 GUM. BULL 58.
'9 The Code provides general authority for the Secretary of the Treasury to "prescribe
all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the Code. iNT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 7805. The provision has been liberally interpreted. In Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741
(1969), the Court indicated the breadth of the power. Plaintiffs were employed by Westinghouse Electric Corp. and participated in a fellowship program in one phase of which
qualified employees devoted full time to their dissertations and received a stipend from
Westinghouse ranging from 70% to 90% of their prior salaries. Plaintiffs contended the
stipend was a scholarship and therefore excludable pursuant to § 117 of the Code. The IRS
relied upon Treasury Regulation § 1.117-4(c) in determining that the stipends represented
compensation and were not excludable.
In reversing the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and upholding the regulation
against plaintiff's attack, the Supreme Court quoted a previous decision:
Mhe Regulations "must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent
with the revenue statutes," and "should not be overruled except for weighty
reasons."
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750 (1969), quoting Commissioner v. South Texas
Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
50 442 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1971). See note 28 supra.
"1 See note 28 supra.
12 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1239(b) (emphasis added).
" See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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many situations, such as Lanjen Chu, it will be clear to the inventor
and his corporation that the invention will be patented. Given such
an invention, the distinction between the patent application before
and after an informal notice of allowability or a formal notice of
allowance seems to be more a distinction of time than of substance,
and therefore not a determinant of underlying value.54 In Lanjen
Chu, for instance, the concurring opinion noted that "[t]he contract
provided for royalty payments over time whether or not a patent
was granted. The grant of a patent would not increase the size of
the royalties, nor would its refusal reduce them."5 5 Thus, a transferor taxpayer might easily avoid the barrier imposed in Stahl by
contracting with his controlled corporation prior to receiving any
notice from the Patent Office, or perhaps even prior to filing his
application for patent.
C. Legislative Solution
A legislative solution would offer a more direct and effective
alternative. Congress could amend section 1239 to explicitly include within its scope sales and exchanges of patent rights prior to
patent issuance. For example, patent applications could be provided for by adding the following language: "For purposes of this
section, the sale or exchange of all substantial rights to a patent, if
represented by a patent application or otherwise, shall be deemed
the sale or exchange of property of a character which is subject to
the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167." The
purpose served by using the words "all substantial rights to a
patent, if represented by a patent application or otherwise" is to
preclude attempts to evade the section by transferring rights prior
to the filing of an application. The suggested language would
require that a sale or exchange of patent rights at any time prior to
patent issuance, as well as during the life of the patent, be included
within the restrictions of section 1239(a).
Such a provision might be considered overly inclusive. Perhaps
it would be desirable to exclude transfers of patent rights where
patentability is truly speculative. 56 A mechanism would be re5, See note 18 supra.
55 486 F.2d at 705 (concurring opinion).
56 At some point prior to patent issuance, while the patent application is pending or
prior to application for patent, it might be considered that eventual patent issuance is so
speculative that § 1239's purpose of preventing the joint benefits of capital gains treatment
and depreciation allowance in certain transactions would not be furthered enough to
warrant the potential unfairness to a transferor, should his invention in fact not be patented.
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quired, therefore, to distinguish sales and exchanges according to
the likelihood of patentability. In the Stahl case this distinction
depended upon receipt of notice from the Patent Office indicating
patentability. Other ways of distinguishing might best be left to IRS
regulations.
Variations in statutory language would permit flexibility by
administrative regulation. The language suggested above for
amending section 1239 could be altered as indicated below by the
italicized words to allow such flexibility: "For purposes of this
section, the sale or exchange of all substantial rights to a patent, if
represented by a patent application or otherwise, shall be presumed
to be the sale or exchange of 'property of a character which is
subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167.'
This presumption shall be subject to such regulationsas the Secretary or his
delegate may prescribe." Because the subsection provides only for a
presumption of depreciability, the way would be open for a transferor to prove otherwise in an appropriate case. The Commissioner could also limit by administrative regulation the inclusiveness of the presumption in order to exclude those situations in
which patentability is considered so remote and speculative that the
property's future depreciability is truly unpredictable.
D. Administrative Solution
Even under the present statutory language, administrative
regulation could provide a solution. The phrase "of a character...
subject to. .. depreciation" is probably broad enough to permit a
treasury regulation to the effect that, for purposes of section 1239,
patent applications will be treated as depreciable property. 57 This
regulation would seem to reflect the expectations of the parties to a
" Such a regulation would resemble the regulation upheld in Bingler v. Johnson, 394
U.S. 741 (1969) (see note 49 supra ). In Bingler the contested regulation defined the statutory
term "scholarship." With regard to § 1239, the proposed regulation would define "of a
character... subject to ... depreciation." In Bingler the court of appeals had relied on an
inconclusive statutory history and the canon of construction that expressio unius est exclusio
alterius in holding the regulation invalid. The Supreme Court responded that
[s]ection 117 provides, however, only that amounts received as "scholarships" or
"fellowships" shall be excludable [from income]. And Congress never defined what
it meant by the quoted terms.... The regulation here in question represents an
effort by the Commissioner to supply the definitions that Congress omitted. And it
is fundamental, of course, that as "contemporaneous constructions by those
charged with administration of" the Code, the Regulations "must be sustained
unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the .revenue statutes," and
"should not be overruled except for weighty reasons."
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50, quoting Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber
Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948) (footnote omitted).
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patent application transfer that eventually a patent will issue. 58
Judge Campbell of the First Circuit suggested that a regulation
59
embodying similar provisions would be acceptable.
It is conceivable, of course, that a fear expressed in the Lanjen
Chu opinion might be realized if such a regulation were promulgated or if one of the proposed amendments to the section were
enacted. The court of appeals was concerned that
the inventor who has the misfortune to transfer a patent application that is subsequently disapproved would face the worst of
both possible worlds: he would pay ordinary income rates on his
initial gain from the transfer, while his controlled corporation
would never be able
to take any depreciation deduction against
60
ordinary income.

The harshness feared by the court is ameliorated, however, by
section 1239's allowance of a substantial tax advantage to the
transferor even where he owns up to eighty percent of the transferee corporation. In addition, explicit statutory provisions or
administrative regulations would put all prospective transferors
and transferees on notice of possible disadvantageous tax consequences.
Despite the concern shown by the Lan Jen Chu court, the
degree of risk involved in such transfers is probably minimal.
Patent rights are saleable prior to patent issuance, it may be
assumed, largely because the parties can predict patentability. If
the particular facts of the transfer are such that the parties see no
risk, or small risk, of non-patentability, then there is a correspondingly minor risk that the transferor "would face the worst of both
possible worlds." Besides, an inventor or other holder of patent
rights desiring absolute certainty before transferring to his
controlled corporation can achieve that certainty simply by waiting
until a patent is issued-o'r finally denied. By so doing, he will
know definitely whether a depreciation allowance is available to the
transferee and he will not fall prey to losing both his capital gain
advantage and his corporation's depreciation allowance.
By taking such a cautious course, the inventor and entrepreneur would lose the effective extension of the patent
" See note 18 supra.
For the reasons offered in discussing an amendment to § 1239 of the Code, the
proposed regulation should afford the taxpayer the opportunity to prove that a patent will
not issue in the normal course. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
50 Lan Jen Chu v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 696, 705 (1st Cir. 1973) (concurring
opinion).
60 Id. at 701.
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monopoly-usually a matter of several years-that results from
initiating operations under the patent while the application is still
pending. However, this pre-patent monopoly is simply a windfall,
and neither Congress nor the IRS should consider this possible loss
a sufficient reason for hesitation in eliminating a tax loophole.
IV
CLOSING THE BREACH-SECTION

1235

While section 1239 of the Code, the central statute in.LanJen
Chu, limits capital gains treatment of the proceeds from sales or
exchanges of depreciable property between certain related persons, the underlying availability of capital gains treatment derives
from other sections of the Code. These provisions give rise to
alternative methods for plugging the section 1239 loophole.
The trafisferor of patent rights may look to three Code sections for capital gains treatment. Two of these, sections 122161 and
1231,62 are of general applicability and, for purposes of this discus§ 1221. Capital asset defined.
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held by
the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not
include(1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would
properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of
the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character wbich is subject
to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used
in his trade or business;
(3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or
memorandum, or similar property, held by(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,
(B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a
taxpayer for wbom such property was prepared or produced, or
(C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined, for purposes of determining gain from a sale or excbange, in
wbole or part by reference to the basis of such property in the bands of a
taxpayer described in subparagraph (A) or (B);
(4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade
or business for services rendered or from the sale of property described in
paragraph (1); or
(5) an obligation of the United States or any of its possessions, or of a State
or Territory, or any political subdivision thereof, or of the District of Columbia,
issued on or after March 1, 1941, on a discount basis and payable without
interest at a fixed maturity date not exceeding one year from the date of issue.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221.
62 Under § 1231 of the Code net gain from the sale, exchange, or involuntary
conversion of depreciable business property held for more than six months which is neither
inventory, primarily for sale to customers, nor a copyright, literary, musical or artistic
61
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sion, can be treated alike. Taking capital gains under sections 1221
and 1231 will be referred to as the "ordinary" method. The third
Code provision, section 1235,63 the "special" method, is directed
exclusively to the sale or exchange of patents and patent rights.
Chu presumably relied upon the "ordinary" method in declaring the proceeds from sale of his patent application as long-term
capital gain. Accordingly, he had to satisfy three conditions: (1) the
patent application must be a "capital asset" in the transferor's
hands; 64 (2) the transfer must be a "sale or exchange"; 65 and (3)
composition in the hands of certain taxpayers, is treated as long-term capital gain while net
loss is treated as ordinary loss.
Originally enacted as § 117(j)(2) of the 1939 Code, § 1231 was reenacted substantially
unchanged in the 1954 Code. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A275 (1954).
63 § 1235. Sale or exchange of patents.
(a) General.
A transfer (other than by gift, inheritance, or devise) of property consisting of
all substantial rights to a patent, or an undivided interest therein which includes a
part of all such rights, by any holder shall be considered the sale or exchange of a
capital asset held for more than 6 months, regardless of whether or not payments in
consideration of such transfer are(1) payable periodically over a period generally coterminous with the
transferee's use of the patent, or
(2) contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the property
transferred.
(b) "Holder" defined.
For purposes of this section, the term "holder" means(1) any individual whose efforts created such property; or
(2) any other individual who has acquired his interest in such property in
exchange for cousideration in money or money's worth paid to such creator
prior to actual reduction to practice of the invention covered by the patent, if
such individual is neither(A) the employer of such creator, nor
(B) related to such creator (within the meaning of subsection (d)).
(c) Effective date.
This section shall be applicable with regard to any amounts received, or
payments made, pursuant to a trausfer described in subsection (a) in any taxable
year to which this subtitle applies, regardless of the taxable year in which such
transfer occurred.
(d) Related persons.
Subsection (a) shall not apply to any transfer, directly or indirectly, between
persons specified within any one of the paragraphs of section 267(b); except that, in
applying section 267(b) and (c) for purposes of this section(1) the phrase "25 percent or more" shall be substituted for the phrase
"more than 50 percent" each place it appears in section 267(b), and
(2) paragraph (4) of section 267(c) shall be treated as providing that the
family of an individual shall include only his spouse, ancestors, and lineal
descendants.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235(a)-(d).
64 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1221, 1222(3).
If Chu's patent had been "property used in the trade or business" (§ 1231(a)) it would
have qualified for capital gains, if at all, under § 1231. See General Spring Corp., 22 P-H
TAx CT. REP. & MEm. DEC. 770, 776 (1953). Because the "sale or exchange" and holding
period requirements are identical for capital assets and "§ 1231 assets," the textual discussion
applies equally to both.
65 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1222(1)-(10), 1231(a).
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the patent application must have been held longer than six
66
months.
The problems which confronted inventors prior to the enactment of section 1235 stemmed from the first two requirements. In
determining whether a patent is a "capital asset" the traditional
dividing line has been drawn between amateur and professional
inventors, a distinction which has given rise to arbitrary results in
practice. 6 7 If the taxpayer is found to be an amateur inventor, his
patent may qualify as a capital asset, while a patent developed by a
professional inventor is necessarily excluded from capital asset
status because it is "property held . . . primarily for sale to
' 68
customers in the ordinary course of . . . business.
The traditional test for determining whether a "sale or exchange" of patent rights has occurred depends on whether the
transfer is an assignment or a license. 69 In general, the transaction
is characterized as an assignment where the transferor gives to the
transferee "all substantial rights" under the patent. 70 But where
Id. §§ 1222(3), 1231(a).
67 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1954). Compare First National Bank
66

v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 818 (D.N.J. 1955) (although inventor in business of making
and selling optical and acoustical inventions, held amateur inventor of mechanical toothbrush bristle grinder), with Harold T. Avery, 47 B.T.A. 538 (1942) (patent sold in "ordinary
course of trade or business" when, out of twelve patents developed over seventeen years,
inventor sold three patents and granted rights in two others).
68 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(1).
69 See, e.g., Broderick v. Neale, 201 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1953); Lamar v. Granger, 99 F.
Supp. 17, 36 (W.D. Pa. 1951); R. ELIUS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS §§ 49, 55 (3d ed. 1955); Dunn,
Tax Considerations in Patent Assignments and Licenses Between Related Corporations, 16 TAX L.
REv. 315 (1961); Note, Capital Gains Treatment of Patent Transfers, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REv.

844, 859 (1966).
70 In a patent infringement case, Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891), a test
for distinguishing patent assiguments from licenses was introduced which was used extensively in tax cases in subsequent years. The Court said that an assignment can be nothing less
than
the exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention throughout the United States;
or... an undivided part or share of that exclusive right; or... the exclusive right
under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the United States.... Any
assignment or transfer, short of one of these, is a mere license ....
Id. at 255. The terminology "make, use and vend," of course, describes precisely the
monopoly given the patentee. See note 14 supra.
Section 1235 of the Code refers to "[a] transfer.., of all substantial rights to a patent,
or an undivided interest therein." The Senate report evidences the intent to include, by
these words, the criteria for a sale or exchange which had been developed in the case law.
See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 113-14 (1954).
Thus, the issue now is examined by the IRS and the courts in terms of whether or not
"all substantial rights" have been transferred regardless of the Code section under which the
transfer is viewed. But the underlying test remains the same as that enunciated in Waterman.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1), T.D. 6263, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 572; Porter, Capital Gains on
Patents Without Benefit of Section 1235, 41 TAXES 800, 801 (1963).
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any substantial right is withheld, the transaction is characterized as
71
a license.
Related to the question of whether "all substantial rights" are
transferred is the method adopted for payment. It is common for
the purchase price to vary with the patent's use or productivity.
This method of payment was used in Lan Jen Chu where a large
portion of the consideration was represented by a promise to pay
to the transferor fifteen percent of the gross selling price of every
antenna system manufactured and sold by the purchasing
corporation.7 2 It was long argued by the IRS that such contingency
payments are royalties, and because the transferor retained a right
to royalties, considered by the IRS to be a substantial right in the
patent, the transaction was to be regarded as a license so that
73
capital gains treatment was unavailable to the transferor.
It was against this background, in which "professional" inventors were ineligible for capital gains treatment and "amateurs"
faced the prospect of litigation where the proceeds from the patent
transfer were contingent on productivity or use, that section 1235
was enacted by Congress. The new provision was intended to
"liberalize the tax treatment of income from inventions in order to
remove barriers which thwart and discourage the genius of the
independent American inventor,' '7 4 and "to provide a larger incen'7 5
tive to all inventors to contribute to the welfare of the nation.
76
Section 1235 was intended to promote individual inventiveness
The question of what rights can be retained by the patent transferor while still fulfilling
the "all substantial rights" test has perplexed a great many taxpayers, IRS personnel, and
courts. The basic rule that "all substantial rights" means the exclusive right to "make, use
and vend" is subject to numerous qualifications. See, e.g., Rolman v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d
634 (4th Cir. 1957) (transfer of patent where vendee agreed not to assign right to use except
in conjunction with transfer of all vendee's business held assignment); Armco Steel Corp. v.
United States, 263 F. Supp. 749 (S.D. Ohio 1966) (exclusive rights to manufacture and sell in
one country held assignment); Gruber v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 510 (D. Ore. 1958),
rev'd on othergrounds sub nor., Mayer v. United States, 285 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1960) (licensing
agreement held sale although right to use omitted from transfer where right to use of no
commercial value); Estate of Milton P. Laurent, Sr., 34 T.C. 385 (1960) (assignment of
undivided part of all patent rights held sale); 3BJ. MERTENS, supra note 34, § 22.133, at 922;
Breier, Special Provision for Inventors Insures Capital Gains but Requires Strict Compliance, 7
TAXATION FOR ACCOUNTANTS 226, 229 (1971); Dunn, supra note 69; Porter, supra at 800,
802; Note, supra note 69, at 845-46; Comment, CapitalGains Treatment on Proceedsfrom Patent
Transfers, 34 Mo. L. REv. 98, 105 (1969); P-H 1974 FED. TAXES
32,408.
71 See, e.g., Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891).
2 See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
73 See Mim. 6490, 1950-1 CuM. BuLL. 9.
71 100 CONG. REc. 8996 (1954) (remarks of Senator Millikin).
71 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A280 (1954).
716See S. RzP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 113-14 (1954).
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by treating sales or exchanges of patent rights by "holders"' 7 as if
they were sales or exchanges of capital assets held for more than
six months, without regard to the actual holding period, without
regard to royalty-like payments contingent upon the use or productivity of the patent, and without regard to whether the taxpayer
is an amateur or professional inventor.78 The section is inapplicable, however, to transactions between certain related persons, including transactions between an individual and a corporation
79
twenty-five percent or more of which is owned by him.
A.

Section 1235 "Exclusivity"
It is arguable that for transfers of patent rights where the
transfercr is a "holder" and the method of payment is described by
section 1235(a)(1) or (2), as in Lanjen Chu, this section supplies the
exclusive means of capital gains treatment.8 0 If this exclusivity had
been accepted by the Lanjen Chu court the action very likely would
have been decided in favor of the IRS since the transferor clearly
held a larger than twenty-five percent interest in the corporation.8 '
But the IRS made no such argument, apparently hecause it had
previously decided that even where the transfer is by a "holder,"
and payment is by one of the methods prescribed by sections
1235(a)(1) and (2), section 1235 is not the exclusive path to capital
82
gains.
After passage of section 1235, the IRS reversed its position
regarding royalty payments and capital gains under the "ordinary"
method. The new position of the IRS was stated in an acquiescence
to Edward C. Myers8 3 declaring that regardless of royalty-like pay7 A "holder" is loosely defined as the inventor or his financer. See INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 1235(b).
78 Id. § 1235.
9 Id. § 1235(d)(1).
80 See Myron C. Poole, 46 T.C. 392 (1966). See also Breier, supra note 70, at 231;
Comment, supra note 70, at 102.
81 See Lan Jen Chu v. Commissioner, 486 F.2d 696, 699-700 nn. 2 & 3. (1st Cir. 1973).
82 Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(b) (1957); Rev. Rul. 69-482, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 164.
83 Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 408. In Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946),
the inventor had transferred to B.F. Goodrich the exclusive "license" to make, use, and sell
throughout the United States products under the inventor's patent for rubber-covered
flexib!e steel track in return for annual payments based upon a percentage of total sales.
Myers initially reported his royalties as ordinary income but later filed for a refund claiming
that since the payments were received from the sale of a patent the gains should be taxable
at capital gains rates. Id. at 261. The Commissioner argued that because the method of
payment was inconsistent with a sale, the proceeds should be taxable as ordinary income.
The Tax Court declined to view the method of payment as dispositive, preferring instead
the test of what constitutes an assignment of patent rights laid down by the Supreme Court
in Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891). For the rule in Waterman see note 70 supra.
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ments there is an assignment of patent rights where there is a grant
of the exclusive right to make, use, and sell under the patent.
Thus, if a transfer of patent rights otherwise qualified for capital
gains treatment under the "ordinary" method, the fact that the
proceeds were contingent upon productivity or use would be
considered irrelevant to the availability of such treatment.
With the Commissioner's acquiescence in Myers, the way was
cleared for the patent transferor to enjoy long-term capital gains
proceeds under both the "ordinary" and
tax rates on royalty-like
"special" methods.8 4 The ability to move between these two provisions gives the taxpayer a substantial advantage. Section 1235 does
away with conditions the inventor may find onerous under the
"ordinary" method, but restricts corporate relatedness more than
section 1239. Corporate ownership is limited in the "ordinary"
method only by section 1239(a)(2), which, in allowing the transferor or transferee to own as much as eighty percent of the
corporate transferee or transferor, is considerably more generous
than section 1235(d)(1), which limits this ownership to less tban
twenty-five percent.
These inconsistent limitations on relatedness have inspired
controversy over whether section 1235, if applicable to a specific
patent transfer, is intended to be the exclusive provision under
which that transfer can qualify for capital gains treatment.8 5 The
IRS has announced, in Treasury Regulation section 1.1235-1(b)
and Revenue Ruling 69-482,86 that "the mere fact that a patent
Initially, the IRS had acquiesced in the Myers holding (1946-1 CuM. BULL. 3), but in
1950 the IRS reversed its position and issued a non-acquiescence (Mim. 6490, 1950-1 CUM.
BULL. 9). See note 73 and accompanying text supra. After enactment of § 1235 the IRS again
acquiesced in Myers (Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 408), and this is its present
position.
The Commissioner withdrew his 1946 acquiescence contemporaneously with the rise of
sentiment in Congress that transfers of patents should be taxed at ordinary rates. In 1950,
Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to exclude a "copyright, a literary,
musical, or artistic composition, or similar property" held by the creator, or by one whose
basis in the property was determined by reference to the creator's basis, from the capital
gain sections. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §§ I17(a)(I)(c), (i)(I)(c) (INT. REV. CODE. OF 1954,
§§ 1221(3), 1231(b)(1)(c)). The House bill excluded patents held by inventors as well, but this
provision was deleted in the Act because it was considered desirable to foster individual
inventiveness through tax incentives. See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1950).
84 It would be incorrect on the basis of the IRS acquiescence in Myers to conclude that
§ 1235 is now surplusage. On the contrary, § 1235 offers the inventor several liberal
provisions: the section disregards the professional/amateur distinction, there is no required
holding period, and there is assurance that royalty payments will not be treated as ordinary
income.
15 See, e.g., Breier, supra note 70, at 231; Comment, supra note 70, at 102.
86 Rev. Rul. 69-482, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 164.
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transfer by a holder for contingent amounts does not qualify for
long-term capital gains treatment under section 1235 of the Code,
will not prevent it from qualifying for such treatment under other
provisions of the Code ....

87
,,
The Tax Court, on the other hand,

held in Myron C. Poole88 that
if the payments for a patent are contingent upon productivity,
use, or disposition, or if they are payable periodically over a
period generally coterminous with the transferee's use of the
patent, section 1235 is the holder's exclusive provision for qualifying for capital gains treatment. 89
The statutory language provides no solution to these different
interpretations. Equal support for both positions can be found in
the legislative history of section 1235. The Senate Committee
Report on the bill, for example, stated:
In enacting this section . . . your committee has no intention
of affecting the operation of existing law in those areas without its
scope. For example, the tax consequences of the sale of patents...
by individuals who fail to qualify as "holders," or by corporations, is to be governed by the provisions of existing law as if this
section had not been enacted.9 0
The IRS invoked this passage in Revenue Ruling 69-48291 to
support its decision that section 1235 was not exclusive. The
passage is ambiguous, however, since it fails to define what is
meant by "areas without its scope." It is unclear whether failure of
any one requirement embodied in section 1235-e.g., a sale between an individual and a corporation twenty-five percent or more
of which is owned by him-puts the transfer outside that section's
scope, or whether only a failure of the "holder" requirement found
87 Id.
88 46 T.C. 392 (1966).
89 Id. at 404.

91 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 441 (1954) (emphasis added).
In the same paragraph of its Report the Senate Finance Committee stated:
It is the intention of your committee that, if the mode of payment is as
described in subsection (a), the sale of a patent by any "holder" must qualify under
the section in order for such "holder" to obtain capital gain treatment. However,
the benefits of this section are to be limited to those individuals and transfers
qualifying under its terms.
Id.
It was said in the House Report, however, that
This section provides the only method under the new code whereby the
inventor of a patent can obtain capital gains on its sale. Failure on the part of the

seller to meet its conditions will result ...in the entire transaction being taxed to
him as resulting in ordinary income.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A280 (1954).
11 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 164.
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in subsection (b) puts the transfer outside its scope. Use of the
words "[fjor example" lends credence to the former view.
Nevertheless, the Tax Court adopted the latter position in Myron C.
Poole,92 relying upon an ostensibly logical interpretation of the
section:
If a holder transfers a patent resulting in the payment of
royalties in the manner described in section 1235(a) to a related
person, and if we were to hold that such a transfer is entitled to
capital gains treatment under another provision of law, we would
be nullifying section 1235(d). 3
The court's objection might be answered, however, by reference to the fact that Congress, during discussion of section 1235,
was aware of court rulings in favor of the applicability of capital
gains treatment even though the patent seller's proceeds were in
the form of royalty-like payments, 94 yet it failed to revoke such
applicability explicitly. Furthermore, Congress knew that the IRS
position was not dispositive of the issue, but only created
uncertainty. 95 It can be argued that section 1235, rather than being
an attempt to preempt the question, was intended only "[t]o
obviate the uncertainty" by giving "statutory assurance" 96 to certain
holders and within certain limits (e.g., section 1235(d)(1)). Beyond
these limits, section 1235 arguably was intended to have no
effect.9 7 The "statutory assurance," it might be argued, was given
only to the degree necessary to afford a secure "opportunity [for]
inventors to dispose of their patents,"98 and beyond this a "holder"
might still have a capital gain if his particular circumstances fit the
narrower qualifications imposed by the "ordinary" method. 99
92 46 T.C. 392 (1966).

93 Id. at 404.
94 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439 (1954).
" According to the Senate Report, "the prospect of continued litigation was engendered in this area by the issuance of Mimeograph 6490 . . . ," therefore, section 1235 was
intended "[t]o obviate the uncertainty caused by this mimeograph."Id.
96 Id.
" See, e.g., id. at 441:
The sale of a patent between an individual and a corporation more than 50 percent
in value of the outstanding stock of which is owned, ... by or for such individual
would not, for example, be entitled to capital gain treatment under this section.
(emphasis added). Section 1235(d), as originally enacted, adopted the limits of § 267(b) and
denied capital gain treatment where the transfer was between an individual and a corporation in which he owned "more than 50 percent" in value of the stock. Section 1235(d) was
amended in 1958 to lower the permissible ownership value to "25 percent or more."
Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 54(a), 72 Stat. 1644.
98 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A280 (1954).
99 It can also be argued that construing § 1235 as an exclusive path to capital gains on
holders' sales of patents contradicts the section's liberalizing purpose. The argument results
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This discussion is not intended to suggest, however, that the
Tax Court's holding in Poole is not substantially supported by
reference to the section's legislative history. On the contrary, several passages in both the House and Senate reports strongly
suggest that it was indeed believed that section 1235 would provide
the only method of obtaining capital gains treatment for patent
holders to whom proceeds were payable periodically or contingent
on the patent's use or productivity.10 0 Since the statutory language
itself contains no words of exclusivity and because the legislative
history provides only contradictory answers to the question, a final
answer may have to await congressional clarification.
B.

Section 1235 Exclusivity as a Solution

Because the applicability of section 1235, unlike that of section
1239, is not dependent upon the depreciable character of the
transferred property, it might be concluded that the Lan Jen Chu
problem could be solved by the exclusive application of section
1235 as in Poole. ' 0 ' Thus, a transferor of a patent application, such
as Chu, would not be eligible to take his consideration as capital
gain because he owns "twenty-five percent or more" of the
transferee's capital stock. Because applicability of section 1235,
unlike section 1239, does not depend upon depreciability, the
theory continues, the loophole in sales of patent applications
among related parties would be closed. Because Chu apparently
was a "holder;" the decision in that case probably would have been
favorable to the IRS had section 1235 been the exclusive capital
gains provision for patent transfers by holders. Even if section
1235 were so construed, however, the larger problem presented in
from the fact that at least certain inventors could realize capital gains on royalty-like
proceeds from sales of patents prior to enactment of § 1235 (see Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258
(1946)). Since the restriction on capital gains among related persons (§ 1239(a)(2)) under the
"ordinary method" (see notes 61 & 62 and accompanying text supra) at the time of enactment
of § 1235 was more liberal than under the "special method" (see note 63 and accompanying
text supra), enactment of § 1235 as an exclusive method of capital gains would have the
actual effect, in this respect, of taking away a tax incentive. It should be noted, however, that
this argument is somewhat less forceful when looking back at the time of § 1235's enactment
when the limit on relatedness in a transfer between a corporation and shareholder was not
as far from the "more than 80 percent" of § 1239(a)(2). Originally, capital gains were
allowed under § 1235 except in transactions among related persons as defined by § 267(b).
The latter section provided for corporate interests as high as 50 percent. Section 1235(d) was
amended by the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, § 54(a), 72 Stat.
1644, which lowered the permissible interest limit to its present "25 percent or more." INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235(d)(1).
100 See note 90 supra.
101 46 T.C. 392 (1966).
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the Lan Jen Chu case would nevertheless remain untouched, for a
non-"holder" transferor of a patent application-e.g., the inventor's
transferee-would fall outside the scope of section 1235. Thus,
section 1239's inapplicability to non-depreciable patent applications
would still leave a loophole for non-"holders."
In order for section 1235 to solve the problem resulting from
the non-applicability of section 1239 to patent application transfers, they would have to be brought within the enlarged scope of
an amended section 1235(d). The heart of section 1235, embodied
in section 1235(a), would remain unaltered. Only the restrictive
part of the section, subsection (d), would be enlarged so as to apply
not only to section 1235 transfers, but to all transfers of patent
rights not limited by section 1239. The availability of capital gains
treatment on transfers of patent rights would therefore be limited
by a restriction on the relation of transferor to transferee under
either section 1235 or section 1239 regardless of the form of the
rights or the statutory methods under which capital gains treatment was sought. Thus, related transferees of issued patents would
be restricted by either section 1235(d) or 1239(a) depending upon
whether the transferor claimed capital gains under section 1235 or
under section 1222; transferees of patent applications would be
restricted in both instances by section 1235(d).
As a final step in this alternative solution restrictions on
relationships among the parties to the transaction which would
deny capital gains treatment to the patent application transferor
under section 1235(d) should be made equivalent to the counterpart restrictions under section 1239(a). Although varying policy
considerations may account for the difference in the disqualifying
corporate interests embodied in these two sections, those policy
considerations would be inapplicable in differentiating patent applications from issued patents. Since the purpose of amending
section 1235(d) is to equalize the statutory treatment applied to
patents and applications, meaningless ancillary differences in
statutory treatment are undesirable.
CONCLUSION

Section 1239 of the Code is intended to restrict the availability
of capital gains on transfers of depreciable property among related
taxpayers. While patent applications are not depreciable, their
transfer among related parties gives rise to abuses otherwise foreclosed by section 1239. No substantial distinction meaningful for
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income tax purposes exists between transfers of patent applications
and transfers of patents. Therefore, the tax law should apply
equally to both.
Judicial, administrative, and statutory solutions are available to
close the section 1239 loophole delineated in Lan Jen Chu. The
judicial solution employed in Stahl has the advantage of immediate
availability; but it is too easily avoided. A treasury regulation would
be the quickest solution and would be effective to close the
loophole by providing that patent applications will be considered
"of a character" subject to depreciation. Finally, Congress might
either amend section 1239(b) to include patent applications, or
enlarge section 1235 so that all transfers of patent rights would be
included within the proscriptions of section 1235(d).
Leslie D. Locke

